The 21 chapters, by a range of leading international experts, are organised into six sections, built around a central focus on the responsibilities of scientists for biosecurity, and serve to give a proper context for understanding what is at stake in the coming decades. This book is intended to contribute to an understanding of the problems of wider biological security beyond the laboratory door, and the less familiar aspects of responsible scientific conduct. The accompanying Biological Security Education Handbook available below combines teaching material with an active team-based learning approach to empower educators, students and practitioners as they begin to engage with biological security.
It aims to supplement this Guide by providing its users with tips and insights into how to implement its content in different educational settings. This publication was produced by the Bradford Disarmament Research Centre and first published in January This book is available to download and use free of charge. The book was supported through a collaboration between the CBB and the Danish ministries of defence, foreign affairs and health.
The Dutch Biosecurity Office has developed two toolkits that can be helpful to provide an indication of the current level of biosecurity. These toolkits are intended for organisations that work with biological agents or come into regular contact with them.
Both toolkits were developed in collaboration with a multidisciplinary expert group on biosecurity. The eight pillars of biosecurity are — awareness, personnel reliability, transport security, information security, accountability for materials, response, management, and physical measures.
This film is useful for persons that are directly or indirectly involved in handling dangerous pathogens and high risk biological material. The Catalogue of Civil Society Assistance to States Parties annually highlights the contributions of civil society to the BWC and States Parties and to the enhancement of biological safety and security.
From Ottawa to Hamburg, there are civil society assistance programs across the world that are available to support the implementation of the BWC. The catalogue includes organization and project descriptions and points of contact for each program, which aims to facilitate stronger connections between civil society and State Parties in need of assistance. Additionally, the U. Department of State, in its role as the lead U. Further, an interagency review is conducted in appropriate cases, including when other treaty parties formally raise concerns regarding U.
Finally, Congress performs oversight functions through committee hearings and budget allocations. This Report addresses U. There are processes and controls within the U. Additionally, the Department of State, as the lead U. These processes and controls operate in parallel, and in addition to the Congressional oversight process. In , DOD established the first such department-level process.
DOD components ensure that their implementing program offices adhere to DOD compliance directives and seek guidance from the offices charged with oversight responsibility. For example, DHS similarly established a compliance review process to assess DHS-sponsored research for compliance with all relevant arms control agreements. In addition, all Federal departments and agencies that fund, direct, or execute classified life sciences research are required to implement oversight measures to ensure all department or agency activities comply with applicable domestic and international legal obligations, and to report on classified life sciences research projects and on the functioning of their oversight processes.
In , the United States continued to be in compliance with all of its obligations under arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements. When other countries have formally raised a compliance concern regarding U. All U. Nevertheless, Russia continues to raise questions about U. These Russian accusations are groundless. At the Center, USAMRD-G conducts epidemiologic disease surveillance and sample collection, basic science, translational research, and product development, including vaccine development.
These activities are legitimate medical research and do not violate the BWC. The United States has provided a full and complete declaration of its chemical weapons CW and associated CW facilities, and continues to work toward completing the destruction of CW and associated CW facilities, in accordance with its CWC obligations. The original deadline of could not be met because changes based on public safety and environmental concerns in U. The United States has completed destruction of its Category 2 and 3 chemical weapons and has completed destruction of more than There are two CW destruction facilities, one located in Pueblo, Colorado, and one in Blue Grass, Kentucky, that are scheduled to complete destruction of the remaining stockpile not later than December 31, Neutralization is used as the primary destruction technology at both sites.
Additionally, explosive destruction technologies are used to enhance safety, while accelerating destruction schedules at both sites. The United States continues to work very closely with the OPCW during the COVID pandemic to ensure that both destruction sites remain in operation and have continuous on-site inspector presence able to conduct verification activities while addressing the need to take measures to ensure the health and safety of inspectors and personnel at the sites.
It prohibits nuclear weapon tests or any other nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. Under Section IV, paragraph 2, of the June Protocol to the TTBT, each party is required, by not later than June 1 of each year, to inform the other of the number of underground nuclear weapons tests by specified category that it intends to conduct in the following calendar year.
The United States has not conducted any nuclear weapon explosive tests or any nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes since These measures were closely coordinated with NATO Allies, who also continued to implement similar steps in their respective national capacities.
Russia has not challenged this action. During the six-month period between the provision of notice and the U. Unless the United States decides to rejoin the treaty, future compliance reports will not include material on the OST.
In public speeches in and , the presidents of the United States and the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation or Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union pledged, as a political commitment, to take separate but related steps regarding reductions in the number and deployment of their tactical nuclear weapons.
In a September 27, , televised speech to the nation, President George H. Bush issued the first set of unilateral PNI commitments, in which the United States pledged changes in both its strategic and tacical nuclear forces.
The U. In an October 6, , meeting with U. He also confirmed that after completion of the steps outlined in the Gorbachev initiative, there would be no nuclear weapons aboard Russian ships other than submarine-launched ballistic missiles SLBMs.
Little has been done to clarify further the terms used to describe the types of weapons included or the actions taken with respect to withdrawing tactical nuclear warheads from operational units to central storage or destroying the warheads.
On April 12, , then-U. I am not aware of anyone in the Russian government or elsewhere who questions whether the United States has done so. We believe that Russia has not completely fulfilled the Russian side of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. Nuclear Posture Review stated that Russia is either rejecting or avoiding its obligations or commitments under several instruments, including the PNIs. Russia has provided little information substantiating the full implementation of its PNI pledges.
Those weapons were also cut by 50 percent in the Air Force, by 60 percent in missile defense troops and by 30 percent on nuclear submarines of the Russian Navy. Russia currently has an active stockpile of NSNW. Addressing the press after an April 29, , Security Council meeting, then-Secretary of the Security Council Vladimir Putin reportedly said that President Yeltsin had signed a decree on a new concept for the development and use of NSNW; Russian press reports following the meeting said that the Security Council approved a nuclear capability for the SS In May , Colonel-General Yuri Bukreyev, then Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces Directorate, describing the current and future state of affairs of the Ground Forces in Armeyskiy Sbornik , declared that the most important requirements for the Ground Forces included the ability to carry out combat missions with the use of both nuclear and conventional weapons, indicating Russia had retained nuclear warheads for its SS CRBM system.
According to a review of the accomplishments of a senior Russian nuclear weapons scientist at the Russian nuclear weapons laboratory in Sarov, Russia created a nuclear warhead for the Iskander missile.
In November , the Russian MoD noted that the Iskander complex can carry a nuclear warhead in a website announcement that a missile brigade unit in western Russia was receiving Iskander equipment to replace its SSs. The Russian MoD noted that the Iskander can be equipped with a nuclear warhead in its announcement on its website. Based on publicly released data, the United States estimates that by the beginning of Russia had deployed enough Iskander launchers to launch nuclear-capable SS or SSC-7 missiles that is, launchers with two missiles apiece at 12 brigades.
The PNIs, which were announced in Presidential speeches in and , are non-legally-binding unilateral political commitments. There are no specific verification measures associated with these political commitments. The number of nonstrategic nuclear warheads has been reduced by three-fourths and all weapons of this nature have been moved to Russian national territory. As of the end of , States Party had an AP that had entered into force, and Iran was provisionally applying its AP pending its entry into force.
AP entered into force for the United States on January 6, However, more than five years have passed and neither the AP nor the modified SQP have entered into force. It was the view of the United States at the end of that efforts to bring them into force and implement them would require cooperation between the civilian and military elements of the Burmese government. Notwithstanding the political situation in Burma, the United States urges the Burmese government to complete the work necessary to bring the AP and modified SQP into force.
At the same time, the United States urges the full restoration of the democratically-elected civilian government, which has been a key partner in progress to date.
Burma publicly announced its intention to acquire a nuclear research reactor for peaceful purposes as early as , and in it signed an agreement with Russia for assistance building a nuclear research center, including a light-water research reactor. The Burmese government had described the MOU as addressing cooperation on research and development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as well as nuclear safety, assessments of the environmental impact of nuclear energy, and nuclear medical technology.
No significant nuclear projects between the two countries have yet moved forward as a result of this MOU. Burma will also be required to provide the IAEA with expanded inspection access, including to additional parts of its nuclear research program.
When Burma modifies its SQP to conform to the update, this will, among other things, require it to declare all nuclear material. Additionally, Burma will be required to provide early design information for any planned nuclear facilities and corresponding inspection access, obligations which are currently held in abeyance under the existing SQP.
The United States has held a series of workshops for Burmese stakeholders, which included a complementary access exercise to increase awareness of the AP and the modified SQP, and to help prepare for their future implementation.
Such efforts going forward must be assessed in the context of engagement with the military regime. As discussed in prior Reports, North Korea failed to adhere to its commitments under the Agreed Framework.
As further discussed in prior Reports, North Korea also failed to adhere to its commitments to the United States under the Agreed Framework by developing a clandestine uranium enrichment program and by breaking its previous freeze on its plutonium production facilities.
In either case, therefore, North Korea is presently in violation of its IAEA safeguards obligations, since the IAEA has not conducted routine monitoring activities at any of the facilities covered by either agreement.
In a September report, the IAEA assessed, based on indicators and its analysis, that it is almost certain the 5MW e reactor has remained shut down since early December The IAEA also reported that, as of September , activity observed at Yongbyon Radiochemical Laboratory, indicates that a physical presence has been maintained there.
As previously reported, during late September and early October of , the IAEA reported it observed activities consistent with the transfer of major reactor components into the reactor containment building. No additional transfers of such components have been observed since then. Based on observations of activity near the ELWR, including deliveries of materials and the presence of construction vehicles, it is likely that internal construction work has continued during the current reporting period.
The IAEA has not observed any indications of reactor operation, although there was an indication of a test of the infrastructure for cooling water during April , similar to that which was observed in March If successfully completed and operated, the ELWR could provide North Korea with a relatively small source of electricity. It may be intended to provide North Korea with a civilian justification to possess uranium enrichment technology that could be used to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.
In August of , the IAEA reported that there were indications of ongoing mining, milling and concentration activities at locations previously declared as the Pyongsan uranium mine and Pyongsan uranium concentration plant. The United States believes there is a possibility of additional unidentified nuclear facilities in North Korea.
Although Kim Jong Un committed to allow a visit by U. It is also possible that North Korea could develop another nuclear test site, if it chose to do so. Following intensive diplomatic engagement and a thaw in relations between North and South Korea, President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un held a summit in Singapore on June 12, , and signed a joint statement in which Chairman Kim committed to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Since the summit, the United States has continued to engage with North Korea to work toward implementation of the commitments made in Singapore. While no deal was reached, detailed positions were exchanged.
The United States communicated to its DPRK counterparts that the United States was prepared to pursue — simultaneously and in parallel — all of the commitments made in the Singapore Joint Statement, including transforming relations, building a lasting and stable peace, and achieving the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The United States was also prepared to explore how to mobilize investment, improve infrastructure, enhance food security, and more, provided the DPRK fulfills its denuclearization commitments.
President Trump and Kim Jong Un briefly met a third time on June 30, , at the Demilitarized Zone, but no detailed discussions on nuclear issues occurred. While no arrangements were reached, the two sides exchanged views on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The United States remains ready to engage North Korea in a constructive negotiation; however, until the final, fully verified denuclearization of North Korea is achieved, UN and U.
The United States continues to work with a broad range of partners and the international community on the need for continued pressure on North Korea — and the need for continued vigilance against its proliferation activities worldwide — in order to impede its ability to sustain and advance its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs and to incentivize North Korea to engage in sustained and intensive negotiations with the United States to ultimately achieve complete denuclearization The United States has also taken enforcement action, including U.
Treasury sanctions designations, against those involved in UN and U. The denuclearization of North Korea remains the overriding U. During the reporting period, the IAEA Director General DG issued several reports on Iran that make clear that serious, outstanding concerns remain regarding possible undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran today.
As of the end of the reporting period, the matter remained unresolved. In addition, the IAEA reported during that multiple other investigations into possible undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran were open and ongoing. Iran subsequently provided the required access to the two specified locations in August and September For example, the IAEA continues to investigate the possible presence of undeclared uranium metal in Iran in the timeframe and its possible location today.
The potential presence of undeclared uranium metal in Iran would be of significant proliferation concern given its relevance to nuclear weapons research and development. During the reporting period, Iran continued to expand its uranium enrichment activities and stocks of enriched uranium, key factors in the amount of time the United States assesses would be required to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon or device, should Iran decide to pursue nuclear weapons.
If Iran were to manufacture or otherwise acquire a nuclear weapon, such actions would violate its obligations under Article II of the NPT. Iran signed but did not ratify an AP to its CSA in and voluntarily implemented AP measures from late to early , when it stopped such implementation. In , an Iranian opposition group publicly revealed covert nuclear facilities under construction at Natanz and Arak that Iran had failed to declare to the IAEA.
In , the United States, the UK, and France announced that Iran had been constructing a secret, second uranium-enrichment facility, Fordow, in the mountains near the holy city of Qom. Iran informed the IAEA about the existence of the facility at that time, but only after learning that it had been discovered by the United States. From , as detailed in previous Compliance Reports as well as multiple IAEA reports, Iran continued to perform uranium enrichment-related and heavy-water-related activities in contravention of both UNSC and IAEA BOG resolutions, including: research and development work on advanced centrifuges; enrichment of uranium up to nearly 20 percent at both the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant PFEP and the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant; construction of parts of the IR heavy water-moderated research reactor at Arak, which was suited to weapons grade plutonium production; and operation of its heavy water production plant at Arak.
During this timeframe, Iran did not fully cooperate with the IAEA with regard to its declared facilities. In particular, as noted in previous versions of this report, Iran did not provide design information or report design changes in advance of any action taken to modify existing facilities or construct new ones, as required by modified Code 3.
From through , the IAEA reported ongoing concerns about the possible existence in Iran of undeclared nuclear-related activities involving military-related organizations. The report stated that, according to credible reports from multiple sources, Iran had a structured military program through , including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile, and that some nuclear weapon-related activities may have continued after Despite these revelations, Iran continued to refuse to acknowledge or provide certain information about the military dimensions of its past nuclear activities.
This final PMD report found that the coordinated nuclear weapons program was discontinued in , although certain weapons-applicable work related to computer modeling and explosive detonation remained ongoing in Iran until The United States made clear at that time and since that the closing of the PMD agenda item does not preclude the IAEA from investigating any new indications that Iran may possess undeclared nuclear material or be pursuing undeclared nuclear activities.
Netanyahu claimed that the warehouse once contained 15 kilograms kg of nuclear material that had since been removed.
It is essential for Iran to continue interactions with the Agency to resolve the matter as soon as possible. The IAEA continues to investigate the original source of the uranium particles detected at the undeclared location in Iran.
Iran then began exceeding key nuclear-related restrictions in the JCPOA on a step-by-step basis, with an announcement of a new step approximately every 60 days. In mid-June , Iran publicly announced it would exceed the low enriched uranium stockpile volume limit kg, on July 7, Iran announced its intent to enrich above the 3. In early September , Iran announced that its next step to scale back implementation of its JCPOA commitments would involve lifting all limits on its development of more advanced centrifuges for uranium enrichment.
On November 5, , Iran announced that its fourth step to scale back implementation of the JCPOA would involve injecting uranium gas into more than 1, centrifuges at its Fordow enrichment facility to produce enriched uranium. The Fordow facility, revealed as a covert enrichment facility in , is a deeply buried underground facility near the Iranian city of Qom. Iran stated that the Fordow facility was ready to produce 20 percent uranium enrichment with an increased number of centrifuges.
During the reporting period, Iran continued to expand its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. From July to the end of the reporting period, Iran enriched uranium up to 4. Public satellite imagery provided additional information on the new centrifuge assembly plant at Natanz. Press reports noted that new tunnel entrances for underground construction are visible under a ridge in the mountain foothills south of the Natanz FEP, about miles south of Tehran, and the underground construction is compatible with a facility about the same size as the centrifuge assembly building that was destroyed and that Iran indicated it was rebuilding in the mountains.
A flurry of activity in Natanz also captured by satellites in recent months includes the building of new roads and additional excavations, which started after the explosion in July. According to public reporting, imagery analysts had previously identified the area and said that additional tunnels are being constructed, suggesting work on an even larger underground complex is underway.
According to the IAEA report in November, Iran continues to install, test, operate, and accumulate enriched uranium from advanced model centrifuges at the Natanz enrichment facility. Specifically the IAEA reported that five smaller cascades of up to nine IR-4 centrifuges, eight IR-5 centrifuges, six IR-6 centrifuge and another cascade of 20 IR-6 centrifuges, 10 IR-6s centrifuges are operational and accumulating enriched uranium at the pilot fuel enrichment plant.
In recent months, the IAEA reported that Iran is moving centrifuges from an above-ground facility to its underground facility at Natanz, and continues to increase the numbers of centrifuges at Natanz. The underground enrichment hall at Natanz is presumably more protected from sabotage attacks. The November 11 reports indicates that only the cascade of IR-2m centrifuges had been moved to Natanz underground and that they were not yet enriching uranium.
The Nonproliferation Report. Some survivors are left with long-term sequelae and persistent virus in immune-privileged sites for many years. Here researchers report the characterization of the ferret as a model for EBOV infection, reproducing disease and lethality observed in humans. They identify viral RNA in the eye a site of immune privilege and report on specific genomic changes in EBOV present in this structure.
Journal of Virology. Authorities in Democratic Republic of Congo on Thursday declared the end of an Ebola outbreak that emerged in early October in North Kivu province and infected 11 people, killing six of them. Filoviruses are prime examples of emerging human pathogens that are transmitted to humans by zoonotic spillover events. The goal of this study was to measure the removal efficacy of Bacillus atrophaeus spores from a parking lot using spray-based washing methods and wash aids. Journal of Applied Microbiology.
Over the past four decades, governments have slashed budgets and privatized basic services. This has two important consequences for public health. First, people are unlikely to trust institutions that do little for them. And second, public health is no longer viewed as a collective endeavor, based on the principle of social solidarity and mutual obligation. That means an important source of vaccine hesitancy is the erosion of the idea of a common good.
New York Times. The prevalence of omicron jumped sevenfold in a single week, according to the CDC, and at such a pace, the highly mutated variant of the coronavirus could ratchet up pressure on a health system already strained in many places as the delta variant continues its own surge.
But federal and some pharmaceutical executives signal they do not currently favor revising vaccines, saying existing regimen plus boosters are effective. International Journal of Biological Macromolecules.
The faulty coronavirus testing kits developed by the U. CDC in the early weeks of the pandemic were not only contaminated but had a basic design flaw, according to an internal review by the agency. Omicron variant appears to demonstrate substantial population-level evidence for evasion of immunity from prior infection. The response strategy in Denmark has been to delay transmission of the Omicron variant in order to gain time for roll-out of the third vaccine dose and the recently initiated vaccination programme for children aged 5 to 11 years.
However, the rapid acceleration of cases catalysed by superspreading events challenged the mitigation. Despite the capacity to detect Omicron cases early, implementation of travel restrictions and implementation of extended contact tracing efforts, more than one in five cases cannot be linked to previous cases. This indicates that within 1. Between and the late s, the United Kingdom had a limited biological program to provide a retaliatory capability should UK forces be attacked using biological warfare.
Research during these offensive and defensive eras of the UK BW research program has contributed to aerobiological science, leading to a number of positive changes in some areas, including laboratory safety; understanding of infection by the aerosol route; and survival, detection, and identification of airborne pathogens. Congolese microbiologist Dr. That year, Muyembe, then working as a field epidemiologist in Kinshasa, traveled to central Congo to investigate a deadly outbreak of an unidentified infectious disease.
He collected a blood sample from a patient but, due to insufficient local laboratory capacity, sent it on to colleagues in Belgium for further investigation. For the next four decades, it was those scientists, along with peers in England and the United States, who received credit for discovering Ebola.
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