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Checkout Continue Shopping. You must sign in to add this item to your wishlist. Please sign in or create an account. Description In this groundbreaking book, Manuel Delanda analyzes all the different genres of simulation from cellular automata and generic algorithms to neural nets and multi-agent systems as a means to conceptualize the possibility spaces associated with casual and other capacities.
And if I see you performing a sequence of actions, and the action schemata necessary for me to replicate it are thereby primed, then imitation of those actions is rendered more likely.
These mirror systems are then waiting ready to be co-opted into the service of a later-evolving mind-reading system. Since the identification of emotion in others, in particular, can be a subtle business, that one should have a conceptual representation of emotion that can be activated either by visual or other experience, or by a mirror-system-induced experience of the same emotion, or both, makes perfectly good sense.
It does not follow, however, that the recognition of one's own feelings of emotion are primary, or that there isn't a good deal of learned or innate information about emotions and their causal role that gives our identification of emotions in ourselves and others much of its significance.
Chapter 6 had been about what Goldman calls "low-level mind-reading" -- that is, forms of automatic non-conceptual mirroring that play a significant role in mind-reading. Chapter 7 then turns to the "high-level" variety, focusing on the role of pretense or "enactment imagination" in mind-reading and distinguishing it from mere propositional supposition. Much of the chapter is devoted to showing that visual and other forms of imagination are the right kinds of thing to play a simulative role.
All this is nicely handled, but it doesn't really serve to distinguish Goldman's views from weakened forms of theory-theory. Indeed, in the course of the chapter Goldman himself concedes a crucial role for theory at two different junctures. When we wish to predict what someone in a given situation will think or do we have to begin our simulation of them with some pretend inputs.
But selection of the right inputs will have to be guided by theory. Likewise when trying to explain why someone has acted as he has, Goldman thinks that what we do is adopt a "generate and test" procedure -- we try out some imagined inputs to the simulation process, and see if they result in an intention to perform an action of that sort. This is all music to the ears of the kind of theory-theorist who also allows an important role for simulation. Chapter 8 is something of a hodge-podge.
It discusses the emergence of mind-reading in ontogeny and evolution, and discusses its absence in autism. But it also discusses empathy and dual-process theories of empathy, as well as the relationship between simulation theory and control theories of action of the sort proposed and elaborated by Wolpert and colleagues Wolpert and Ghahramani, ; Wolpert and Flanagan, The goal is to review a range of empirical results not covered in earlier chapters, and to show that they support -- or are at least consistent with -- simulationism.
Here again it is unfortunate that Goldman construes simulation theory so weakly and his opponents' views so strongly, since much of this data is equally consistent with weakened forms of theory-theory. For example, Goldman discusses data that infants who have had experience with blindfolds will no longer follow the "gaze" of a person wearing a blindfold who turns his head in one direction or another, whereas infants who lack such experience will do so.
Goldman interprets this result in terms of simulation. But of course one can equally claim that experience with blindfolds enables infants to acquire a new item of theoretical knowledge: people with their eyes covered can't see anything. Chapters 9 and 10 get to what ought to be the heart of the matter. For what makes Goldman's account different from other kinds of theory-simulation hybrid is the distinctive position occupied by first-person knowledge of mental states within his approach.
He needs to claim, in particular, that first-person awareness of mental states is both prior to and serves as the foundation for reading the mental states of another. And so he does. Chapter 9 argues that self-ascription of mental states occurs via a process of introspective self-monitoring and classification that does not depend at all on theoretical knowledge.
And then Chapter 10 argues that the core of our mental state concepts is constituted by an introspective code in the language of thought, which classifies our own internal states on the basis of their introspectible properties, again independently of theoretical knowledge.
These concepts might nevertheless subsequently be elaborated to contain such knowledge, Goldman thinks. It is important to see that introspection of one's own propositional attitudes can't play the sort of foundational role in mind-reading that Goldman supposes, unless a substantive body of theoretical knowledge about the causes and interactions of those attitudes can initially be gained from one's own case alone.
This is because as we noted above, and as Goldman himself acknowledges theoretical knowledge plays an indispensable part in each of the two basic forms of mind-reading predicting what someone will think or do, and explaining what someone has thought or done. Yet if the theoretical knowledge in question were either innate or acquired by theorizing about the minds of other people then there would no longer be any distinction between Goldman and his theory-theory opponents, provided that the latter allow a place for simulation within their accounts.
How plausible is it that knowledge of the causal roles of the various mental state types should be learned from one's own case, then? Such a view faces multiple difficulties. One is that there is direct evidence against the existence of a faculty for propositional attitude introspection of the sort that Goldman's account requires.
The evidence is that humans can be induced to confabulate explanations of their own behavior attributing to themselves intentional states that they demonstrably don't have whenever the actual causes of their behavior are opaque to folk psychology; but they do so with just the same apparent immediacy and introspective obviousness as normal Gazzaniga, ; Wegner, ; Wilson, Goldman is aware of some of this evidence, and claims that it is consistent with a "dual method" model according to which people sometimes introspect their mental states and sometimes attribute them via a process of self-interpretation.
But when the full range of the evidence is considered, this dual-method account becomes unsustainable, I believe Carruthers, forthcoming.
Another problem for the idea that the causal roles of the attitudes are learned from introspection parallels one of the main difficulties for child-as-scientist accounts. This is that all normal children acquire capacities to predict and explain the actions of other people at about the same time, irrespective of wide variations in general intelligence. So they must all have acquired the relevant background knowledge needed for simulation to operate successfully by about the same time, also.
Yet learning the dependence relationships between a set of observable and introspectible events would surely be a general-learning task if ever there was one. If children were initially learning the causal roles of the attitudes from their own case, we would surely predict wide variations in time-to-acquisition, varying with the general intelligence of the children in question. But this isn't what we observe. Yet another difficulty concerns the absence of mind-reading in autism.
Admittedly, Goldman can and does tell a plausible story about how difficulties in empathizing and perspective taking might lead autistic people to be bad at reading the minds of others. But so far as I can see, he must also predict that they should have no difficulty in reading their own minds, unless failures of empathizing always co-occur with deficits of self-monitoring. On the assumption that the introspective faculty is intact in autism, Goldman should predict that autistic people will have no difficulty in articulating and deploying propositional attitude concepts in their first-person use, or in explaining their own actions in propositional attitude terms.
Indeed, since many autistic people are especially good at the sort of focused learning and theorizing that gives rise to knowledge of the causal operations of complex systems, one would predict that this ability combined with introspective access to their own mental states should lead to them being especially good first-person mind-readers. But they aren't. Let me describe just a couple of strands of evidence here. Phillips et al. The children had to shoot a "ray gun" at some canisters in the hopes of obtaining the prizes contained within some of them.
Such social dynamics refer to public opinion formation, partner choice, strategy decisions in social dilemma situations and much more. In the context of such modelling approaches, novel problems in philosophy of science arise. Attempts to understand various aspects of the empirical world often rely on modelling processes that involve a reconstruction of systems under investigation.
Typically the reconstruction uses mathematical frameworks like gauge theory and renormalization group methods, but more recently simulations also have become an indispensable tool for investigation. This book is a philosophical examination of techniques and assumptions related to modelling and simulation with the goal of showing how these abstract descriptions can contribute to our understanding of the physical world. First published 10 years ago, Manuel DeLanda's Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy rapidly established itself as a landmark text in contemporary continental thought.
DeLanda here draws on the realist philosophy of Gilles Deleuze to the domain of philosophy of science. As well as contemporary philosophical insights, the book also tackles new developments in geometry, complexity theory and chaos theory to bring new insights to our understanding of a scientific knowledge liberated from traditional ideas of essence. In the s, John Reber convinced many Californians that the best way to solve the state's water shortage problem was to dam up the San Francisco Bay.
Against massive political pressure, Reber's opponents persuaded lawmakers that doing so would lead to disaster. They did this not by empirical measurement alone, but also through the construction of a model. Simulation and Similarity explains why this was a good strategy while simultaneously providing an account of modeling and idealization in modern scientific. A comprehensive and accessible introduction, as well as an original contribution, to the main philosophical issues raised by climate science.
This unique volume introduces and discusses the methods of validating computer simulations in scientific research. The core concepts, strategies, and techniques of validation are explained by an international team of pre-eminent authorities, drawing on expertise from various fields ranging from engineering and the physical sciences to the social sciences and history. The work also offers new and original philosophical perspectives on the validation of simulations.
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